Sunday, December 30, 2007

MUST READ

Norm Rothery's Benjamin Graham Screener for US Stocks 2008

Saturday, December 29, 2007

Marty Whitman's annual letter to shareholders

This elderly genius' track record is remarkable.

I recommend reading his annual letter for its insight into the long term opportunities available now. Read it here.

My next post will talk a bit about how the small retail investor should approach riding the coat tails of gurus like Mr. Whitman. Blindly following them is likely to disappoint....

Sunday, December 23, 2007

"Pursuing contrarian strategies is a little bit like having your arm broken on a regular basis."

December-21-2007
The Maelstrom Continues. Ignore it.by Todd N Kenyon

If you are an investor, ignore the rest of this post.Still here? You'll be sorry! I am about to toss out a stomach-churning mess of conflicting statements and data that, if you're not already out of the market might just chase you out.How is one supposed to filter through all the noise out there right now? Are we going into a recession? Is inflation back? What is the Fed doing? Will they rescue us? Can they rescue us? Should they rescue us? Do we even need rescuing? Should we even care? I don't have answers, but here are some of the things I am hearing lately.Yesterday we hear that Greenspan thinks the risks of a recession are growing, so he has upped the odds to 50%. I will simply respond by quoting Laurence Peter:"An economist is an expert who will know tomorrow why the things he predicted yesterday didn't happen today."Then I see an interview with Jack Bogle, venerable founder of Vanguard and index fund cheerleader. Very uncharacteristically, Jack said, with a glint of fear in his eye that if he were a speculator, he would be completely out of the market. This from a gentleman who has built his career on the premise that active management is a waste of time. Hmmmm.A couple days ago Buffett was heard to exclaim that if employment slips a recession is certain. Probably true, but Buffett himself has said that:"To the extent that we have any thoughts about macroeconomic factors, short-term market moves, etc., we do our best to ignore them."Next there is inflation. The last two days have seen major jumps in PPI and CPI, especially the headline numbers. Even the so-called core numbers were hotter than expected. This brings up the core vs. headline debate. Core has energy and food prices stripped out, which makes it relevant when we all finally stop driving, heat our houses with firewood and go back to hunting and gathering (or grazing on our lawns) for sustenance. The reason food and energy are removed is because they are inherently volatile, so their volatility can mask trends in real inflation. Fine, but if food and energy prices continue to trend upward over time, (and they have been for a LONG time) we better start paying attention to the headline number. Our wallets certainly are, and so is just about every company I follow.Inflation certainly seems like a concern, yet the media is rife with "Fed whiners" sobbing that Ben let us down on Tuesday (and then Wednesday) by not dropping the funds rate enough (which of course shouldn't be dropped at all if inflation is lurking). Further, no one really seems to know what to make of the Wednesday announcement regarding central bank auctions. He whose name shall not be spoken (ok- Cramer) was in full whine mode on Wednesday, going as far as to suggest that the Fed is clueless and isolated in their ivory tower, and that they probably believe it is "unseemly" for poor every day folks to make money in the stock market. This would be absolutely hysterical if so many folks didn't hang on what's-his-name's every word. He is no dummy, but his short-termism and insatiable thirst for immediate gratification and self aggrandizement frequently stymie his intellect.Interest rates, as defined by the Fed funds rate and 10-yr are low. Period. But as some other Directors have posted here recently, the Fed seems to have little control over real interest rates and less over the so-called liquidity crisis. Libor, mortgage rates, and corporate debt rates could care less about the Fed it seems. I don't think there is a dearth of liquidity out there but there is clearly a paucity of trust. Dick Bove, a veteran bank analyst currently at Punk Ziegle, has a very interesting plot of M3 (no longer an official measure of the money supply because, according to him, it shows what is really happening) that indicates that liquidity is exploding. If the financial institutions can get past being afraid of their own shadows rates will drop and liquidity won't be an issue.What the heck, as stock guys, are we supposed to do with all this information? Nothing. Ignore it. Invest in some good companies at good prices and fuggedaboudit. Take a trip to Mars and check it when you get back. All this noise and wrenching daily volatility are enough to drive anyone crazy.Thing that look cheap keep getting cheaper. Let's not forget that this phenomenon is subject to a self-fulfilling effect for the rest of the year. Tax loss selling, and rampant shorting by myriad hedge funds unhindered by the uptick rule will probably ensure more pain to come in the short term. However, I would much rather be buying those stocks that are already pricing in a recession than those that are priced for perfection and keep going up. Recession or not, cheap stocks should ultimately outperform. Cyclical stocks priced as if this time it really is different and cyclicality is dead? Not so much.James Montier, who recently released a seminal book on behavioral finance, said that "pursuing contrarian strategies is a little bit like having your arm broken on a regular basis." In the short term there is no discernible or quantifiable difference between being wrong and being a contrarian. But as Olstein said recently, if you are concerned about short term volatility, then you are speculating, plain and simple.

Wednesday, December 19, 2007

The bull case for SEB Seaboard Corp- A solid, safe value play

(from Yahoo Finance) "Seaboard Corporation operates in the food processing and ocean transportation industries in the United States and internationally. It primarily engages in the production and sale of fresh, frozen, and processed pork products, such as loins, tenderloins, and ribs; and further processed pork products primarily consisting of raw and pre-cooked bacon under the Prairie Fresh and Daily's brand names to further processors, foodservice operators, grocery stores and other retail outlets, and other distributors. The company also markets wheat, corn, soybean meal, and other commodities worldwide; and involves in milling and grain processing activities. In addition, Seaboard Corporation provides containerized cargo shipping service to approximately 25 countries between the United States, the Caribbean Basin, and Central and South America. As of December 31, 2006, its fleet consisted of 10 owned and approximately 29 chartered vessels. Further, the company engages in the production and refining of sugar cane; the production and processing of citrus fruits; and processes jalapeno peppers. The sugar products are primarily sold in Argentina to retailers, soft drink manufacturers, and food manufacturers; and the citrus products are primarily exported to the global market. Additionally, Seaboard Corporation operates as an independent power producer in the Dominican Republic."

so..... it's:
  • boring
  • small to mid-cap
  • diversified
  • global
  • a century old
  • family owned (3 generations!) with huge insider ownership 72%
  • thinly traded (relatively) and low profile
Value assessment of SEB's financial profile:

  • P/E 8 (near 5 year lows) *note* B. Grahams' value equation P/E x P/B<22 value =" 11.8
  • P/B 1.36 (ditto)
  • P/S 0.62 lowest of comps (strongest variable on future stock price appreciation as per Fisher)
  • EPS 1 year growth 85% 10 year growth 1057% yet share price down 51% from 52 week high
  • P/FCF 6.2 (lowest of comps)
  • Enterprise value/revenue 0.56 (very low and that's good)
  • minimal debt Current ratio 2.86 Quick Ratio 1.6 LT debt<< total assets
  • Quantitative evidence of good management 5 year ROE17 ROA 9.4 ROC 14.4 all at least 50% higher than comps
  • Qualitative evidence of good management-- last conference call CEO warned that stock was at a short term spike in a long term uptrend (and he was right, of course).
  • Guru Irving Kahn bought $30 M worth of stock (he recently added 40% to position in Sept 2007 when share price was > $2000-- it currently trades at $1440/share)
There is a general consensus that agribusinesses have an excellent long term potential for growth world wise, particularly as the evolving south and east Asian middle class demands better quality of food. It should also be noted that Chinese demand for pork and seafood is much higher than other areas of the world and appears to be growing. SEB is well positioned for further EPS growth.

Despite the high share price, the fundamentals suggest that this stock is cheap and has an acceptable margin of safety due to easily manageable debt and excellent cash flows as well as an established very long term track record and a very large insider stake. It will definitely be a good long-term stock to study. I plan to start a position at $1400 for a few shares.

All in the family


When I discussed Columbia Sportswear COLM in another post below, I mentioned that insiders owned 60% of the share float.

The graph above shows a correlation between the relative ownership of the insiders (often families) and the stock performance over time. Pretty impressive, eh?

One can speculate that when the executives who run the company think like company owners rather than employees, they are motivated to act in the shareholders best interest. After all, isn't that human nature?

Along these lines of thinking, I'm planning to analyze another publically traded company with very high insider (family) ownership stakes and rock solid financials: Seaboard Corp SEB

Sunday, December 16, 2007

To catch a falling knife


Owch.

If you haven't done it, you've not been investing long enough or you're simply lying to yourself.

This colorful metaphor describes buying a company when its share price is in free fall. It's not finished falling when you "grab" (buy) it and you're definitely going to get hurt (financially).

If you are a value investor, it's difficult to resist buying companies that you've admired for a long time that suddenly become attractive on paper because the fundamentals we watch so carefully (i.e. the P/E ratio) go the "right" direction. Unfortunately, there is usually a good reason for this--- cheap stocks are usually cheap for a legitimate reason. Efficient market theory is often correct (more so over the long term, but that's a different topic).

If you want an example of a falling knife look at PIR's chart for the past 5 years at the top of the page. Guess who bought several million shares at $16 a few years ago and then capitulated at around $7 for a huge loss last June? Mr. Buffett, himself. I'm certainly not one to criticize as I jumped in there at $6.00 and managed to sell at a minuscule profit before it continued it's downward slide to $3 range.

If WB can make this mistake, anyone can. He has said many times that he only expects to be right in 6/10 of his choices so you should not set such high standards for yourself.

Here are some strategies to reduce the need for palmar suturing:

1. DO NOT RUSH. Force yourself to study a stock for 2-4 full weeks before buying it. Opportunities that need you to act immediately are more often than not based on incomplete information or even out in out scams.

2. KNOW EVERYTHING YOU CAN ABOUT THE STOCK. Read at a minimum the last annual financial report and the last quarter's conference call transcript before you buy. As I've mentioned elsewhere, if you're pressed for time (don't be), read the CFO's presentation and the Q&A grillfest the analysts put the execs through at the end. That usually avoids all the hype/salesmanship and gets right to the cold, cruel numbers you need to know.

3. VOLUME MATTERS. Watch the "volume" numbers (shares changing hands) on a day to day basis. The actual number isn't important-- it's how it compares from day to day. As capitulation hits and the last few shareholders give up on a rebound and finally sell their shares, the volumes drop off for a while (days to weeks, depending on how high profile the stock is). When the price starts to rise while increasing volumes, the value investors have stepped up to the plate with conviction. This is the time to pull the trigger. Having said that, I don't think I have EVER successfully picked a stock's true bottom.

4. BUY IN INCREMENTS. Unless you have very strong conviction or you're only buying a small number of shares (all you can afford), then divide your capital into thirds and buy in minimum one week intervals, hopefully at slightly lower prices each time.

5. BUY ON LONG TERM VALUATION. It's ok to ignore short term reverse catalysts like lawsuits or war. If a stock is falling because it was previously overvalued and it's long term opportunity for growth may be decreasing, then stay away. SBUX (Starbucks) may be a recent example of this.

6. IGNORE THE MEDIA PUNDITS AND THE ANALYSTS. With a few exceptions, they are momentum oriented. A quarter or two of positive or negative stock movement and then they'll change their mind--- too late to the party as usual.

7. STUDY THE GURUS and THE INSIDERS. Only when they put their money where their mouth is. If their stake is in the multimillions, they have conviction. Don't pay too much attention to hedge fund gurus like George Soros. They change their positions more often than their underwear. If Dreman, Whitman, Buffett, Dodge & Cox, Tweedy & Brown, Brian and John Rogers, Cunniff etc take a position, factor it in to your decision making. Always keep in mind that you will be getting this information up to 3 months after the fact. Don't chase the gurus. If the stock is dropping AFTER they bought it (USG is a great example) and it meets other criteria, that's helpful. Always keep in mind that there are many great opportunities that the gurus cannot buy that you can because of the scale of their investments compared to yours (often small to mid caps are not an option for them)

8. FOCUS ON THE COMPANY'S MANAGEMENT OF DEBT. Don't get freaked out by big debt numbers-- compare it to comparable (by market cap and sector) competitors. Certain cyclic industries and banks require leverage to grow. Value investors love to buy quality companies in distress due to short term self limited problems (usually due to external factors outside the company's control). The goal is for you to determine if the company has enough liquidity to weather short term debt (i.e. interest coverage and/or short term mandatory debt payments due over then next 12 months). Fortunately accountants have determined measures to help you assess this- my favourite is the quick ratio (like the current ratio but takes inventory out of the equation-- many inventories are not liquid). A QR of greater than 1 is reassuring. Some industries commonly have QRs less than 1 (retail) and still perform well for shareholders. To analyze these companies further you need to delve into detail about how rapidly the co can sell its inventory when needed (without "channel stuffing") and how many slow paying customers it has (accounts-receivable turnover) as well as interest coverage ratios. Personally, I leave this stuff to high powered securities analysts and stay away investing in them. Better to put those stocks in the "too hard" pile.

l

Saturday, December 8, 2007

Most mutual funds suck

Most people now know that as mutual funds grow (and they always do) they become the market. Performance over time for 80% of actively managed funds = the relevant index's performance minus the fund's MER (management expense ratio).

Ergot, you have a 1/5 chance of picking an actively managed fund that beats the market. Some conclude that the smart thing to do is to buy the market as cheaply as you can with a non-specialized ETF or index mutual fund, shopping around for the cheapest MER you can find. This is reasonable IMHO. I think that for the majority of investors who are not into this kind of thing (investing), the "couch potato" portfolio of low cost ETFs is the way to go. Minimal effort and a long term performance that beats most of the pros.... tough to argue with this approach, eh?

I own only 2 mutual funds. One is from PH&N (known for their low turnover and low MERs) and another from Chou Funds. Francis Chou is a fascinating but low key fellow and a Canadian version of Benjamin Graham. His fund performance over the last 20 years has systematically destroyed most high priced hedge funds' results, most of whom have much shorter track records. If you're interested, you can do more research about him and his funds (he doesn't advertise) via a google search. I don't want his funds to get much bigger than they already are so I definitely don't want to promote him either! (lol)

This 2007 lecture by Francis is worth watching: Francis Chou

Growth is Cool, Value is for Nerds by Todd Kenyon

Growth is Cool, Value is for Nerds
posted on: December 05, 2007

It's true. To be a value investor, you must be a Wall Street outcast. You are required to be a member of the chess team and the audio-visual club. You spend prom night at the mall's video arcade. Amazingly though, value strategies have beaten growth strategies again and again throughout history (come to think of it, most of those high school nerds probably way outperformed the "cool crowd" later in life). Think of just about any of the most famous investors of all time. Yup, they're nerds. RICH nerds.
Value investing may be simple, but it's not easy. Growth or momentum investing is far easier psychologically, since you typically follow the crowd and hang out with the popular stocks. By definition, to get bargains you must buy stocks that the market ignores, dislikes, misunderstands, or all of the above. In essence, you must go in and buy companies while the market, incorporating thousands or even millions of intelligent and experienced individuals, screams at you that you are an idiot. At the very least, you're not one of the "in-crowd". Worse yet, Mr. Market may continue to berate you for months on end. That nerd thing again.
How does one define growth versus value anyway, other than by where their respective practitioners sit in the Wall Street cafeteria? Just ask Wall Street - it loves to slice and dice things into neat little categories. Stocks are commonly divided into sectors, industries, market cap, and growth or value categories among others. Mutual funds are crammed into "style boxes", and so on and so on. A lot of this has to do with figuring out ways to get more of investors' money into more different products: "What - you mean you don't have any East Asian micro-cap core growth exposure? Are you nuts? Better put some cash into our fund!"
I have a much simpler system: good investments and bad investments. As a true value nerd and I have tried to explain in prior posts what that means to me. It really refers to the process I use and the way I look at investing. It does not mean that I look for "value stocks" and avoid "growth stocks" - arbitrary classifications that mean nothing to me. I simply look for good companies selling at bargain prices. Since I attempt to estimate an investment candidate's intrinsic value, I think I know when I am getting a bargain. But here is the key regarding growth vs. value. They are mutually dependent - you can't talk about one without considering the other.
Value is heavily influenced by growth. If a company is able to grow its cash flows for a sustained period, it will be much more valuable than the same company with no growth. Any value investor will tell you that the true value of a business is the discounted sum of future cash flows. So to the extent that there is more cash being generated each year, the value is greater.
We can look at a very simple example using a basic valuation equation known as the dividend discount model (nerd alert!). This model simply says that the value of a company is the cash it will generate next year, divided by your required return less the long-term expected growth of the company's cash flows. Let's say a company is expected to generate $100M in free cash, and you believe it can grow this cash stream at a 7% annual rate. You require a 12% return on your investments. The DDM says this company is worth $2B. What if the company has very little growth left? Say the best it can hope to do is grow at 2% annually. The DDM now tells us the company is only worth $1B. Clearly the growth rate makes a huge difference in intrinsic value.
The danger here is assuming that very rapid growth in the past will continue unabated. If you plug 11% growth into the above equation, the model values the company at $10B, or 100x free cash! You may be asking yourself what good is a model that throws out such a huge range of values depending on your assumptions for one variable. This is a very valid question - the DDM or the related discounted cash flow model can be used to justify any valuation (and frequently do in sell-side research reports) depending on growth and return assumptions.
I love to find companies with robust growth prospects, with one caveat. The less I have to pay for that growth, the better. I simply will not base my valuation models on heroic assumptions about growth. I ideally want growth to be a "free call option": if it occurs, it's free upside. The economy's long-term nominal growth is about 6% (GDP + inflation). So be cautious when assuming a company will grow much faster than that.
In a recent letter to shareholders of his Third Avenue Funds, esteemed octogenarian value investor, Marty Whitman, described what Wall Street really means by growth:
"Buy growth, but don't pay for it. In the financial community, growth is a misused word. Most market participants don't mean growth, but rather, mean generally recognized growth. In so far as growth receives general recognition, a market participant has to pay up." - Marty Whitman Of course Buffett has a thing or two to say about this. For example, the oft-cited, "You pay a high price for a cheery consensus".
So there it is. So-called growth stocks are frequently expensive, because the market has already priced in the growth. In fact, there is often a "popularity premium" thrown on top, making these stocks even more expensive relative to intrinsic value. Unfortunately, mid-teens and higher growth rates are rare and usually fleeting. So-called growth stocks typically have had a good run, and if you hopped on, you might be doing well. The problem is that this momentum-chasing works fine until it doesn't. When it stops working, it's too late to do anything about it, as many market participants found out in the tech bubble. I am not "smart" enough to know when it's about to stop working - if a stock is trading well above intrinsic value, it can only be hope or greed that keeps me invested.
This reminds me of a technology conference I attended in late 1999, sponsored by one of the big brokerage firms. One day during lunch, four of the hottest technology mutual fund managers spoke to a standing-room only crowd. Amazingly, they all as much as admitted that their funds' holdings were grossly overvalued, and that one day it would come to an ugly end. "It'll be like 10 large gentleman trying to abandon a sinking ship through a single porthole all at once", said one of them. They knew that their holdings had no valuation support, yet they felt they had no choice but to keep holding these stocks, as it was their mandate to invest in tech stocks. It had worked fabulously for the past few years. I wonder if they each secretly thought that they would be the one "large gentleman" to make it off the sinking ship safely. None of them are still managing mutual funds as far as I know.
The bottom line, in my book, is that stocks priced with "no visible means of support" eventually fall to earth. By support I am talking about intrinsic value. And when they fall, there is usually no advance warning. Hence I always want to know that a stock's price is supported by its true value. Otherwise, I am speculating or gambling, not investing. If I can't rationally see how the valuation numbers works, I won't touch it.
Buffett again:
"... we think the very term "value investing" is redundant. What is investing if it is not the act of seeking value at least sufficient to justify the amount paid? Consciously paying more for a stock than its calculated value -- in the hope that it can soon be sold for a still-higher price -- should be labeled speculation (which is neither illegal, immoral nor -- in our view -- financially fattening).
I should add that growth's affect on value can work both ways. A stock which appears cheap based on say a low PE ratio or low Price-to-book ratio may be just as grossly overpriced as that racy Chinese internet stock, or even more so. If the company has negative growth prospects, it may be worth much less than its apparently cheap market price (the dreaded "value trap"). And let's not forget about those companies that burn cash - they too may be worth very little even if their accounting earnings show some growth.
I believe that the stocks in my portfolio are all undervalued, most of them greatly so. Several of the stocks I've been buying during the recent panic are near or below the levels I paid, and some are only slightly higher. Hence I believe there are some great ideas in there for my subscribers, including some well known names and some more unusual picks. Subscribers can easily see the prices I paid for my holdings and thus determine if they are currently even cheaper than when I purchased them. That said I have no idea if these stocks will approach fair value next week, next year, or even many years from now. There are no guarantees in the stock market, but to me value investing is the best way to improve your odds.
Let's face it, if this value stuff was easy or popular, everyone would do it and hence there would be little chance for excess returns. I will end another lengthy post with a cautionary quote from Jim Grant, editor of Grant's Interest Rate Observer:
To suppose that the value of a common stock is determined purely by a corporation's earnings discounted by the relevant interest rate and adjusted for the marginal tax rate is to forget that people have burned witches, gone to war on a whim, risen to the defense of Joseph Stalin, and believed Orson Welles when he told them over the radio that the Martians have landed. Investors are prone to be bullish at the top of the market when prices are high, and bearish at the bottom when prices are low. Like war, speculation is a social activity. It is carried out by groups.

Todd Kenyon

Monday, December 3, 2007

DELL-- watch it closely over the next quarter


If you follow the short term froth of the markets like I do, stop right now before it drives you insane!

You probably saw the huge (14% in one day!) sell-off of this household name's stock last week. Investors are sick and tired of waiting for Michael Dell to execute the turn around of this wayward former superstar despite the fact that:

  • it's been less than a full year since Dell re assumed his CEO status
  • the company is making lots of money-- maintaining high levels of FCF and minimal debt and lots of cash in the bank ($12 Billion! v.s. 760 M in debt) for planned share buy-backs
  • the Q3 results showed that sales and earnings exceeded expectations and there was a considerable improvement of gross margins to just short of analysts' expectations of 19%
  • it's at a historical low for P/E (forward = 14)

This stock is clearly oversold. Yes, there is an expense issue--- Dell needs to reduce their head count amongst other fat-trimming measures. The business plan is evolving from the prior approach with more brick and mortar sales via kiosks and Staples/Walmart big box stores and more emphasis on customer service. The management is not doing it fast enough to keep the Street happy. We've seen this happen to Dell in the past and when Michael has the pressure on, he consistently shines and comes through for the shareholders. DELL is one of the best performing securities in history.

For those of us who are don't mind buying and forgetting about it for a while, this would be one of the safer bets, IMHO. Personally, I'm hoping that the Street beats it up a bit more and I can pick it up in the New Year in the high teens or low 20's.

You can do the full analysis easily for yourself.

l

Sunday, December 2, 2007

Sum Up for COLM

There's evidence that Columbia has the balance sheet and management quality to weather the ongoing economic storm in North America. It has significant potential for organic growth worldwide. The current inventory excess is being carried in products that have a strong replenishment demand. Management has plans to route these products via the company's own retail outlets, so this may decrease concerns about further deterioration in the historically healthy margins.

IMHO, the sudden drop in free cash flow is the single most significant issue to worry about, particularly with respect to assessing the company's potential to survive a recession or depression. It appears that Q3 and Q4 drop of FCF is related to the one-time charges of an acquisition and ongoing costs of increased staffing of the new stores which should partially decrease over time.

My plan is to study the stock for the next quarter. If the price is dragged down by the general market into the low 40's or high 30's, I will buy some there. If not, I'll wait to see the Q4 results and if they are reassuring, buy then.

l

Bear case for COLM

  1. dividend is insufficient to compensate for inflation over time
  2. intense competition (i.e. North Face)
  3. margin has deteriorated slightly over the last couple quarters
  4. inventory has increased and backlog decreased up to and including Spring 2008 orders suggesting near term future earnings will be flat
  5. European division has seriously underperformed the rest of the world, with a 18% decrease in revenue
  6. Recent acquisition Pacific Trail has underperformed the rest of the product lines significantly.
  7. costs are increasing slightly and will carry over into the next 1-2 quarters, mostly from SG&A plus personnel costs associated with new retail outlet openings
  8. Free cash flow has turned negative for the first time since 2006 in Q3

The bull case for COLM Columbia Sportswear Company


COLM-->I believe that this small-mid cap 70 year old company shows the qualities I discussed in the post below, making it a stock worth studying over the next few months.

  • sound fundamentals v.s. competitors: P/E 12 (30) P/tangible book 2 (6.22!) P/CF 10 (15)
  • manageable debt: current ratio 5 (v.s. 2.3) leverage ratio 1.2 (v.s. 2.4)
  • strong cash flow: P/FCF 24 (v.s. -59! for comp)
  • rising dividend 1.2% with payout ratio only 15% (easily sustained)
  • some share buy back activity (minimal)
  • strong brand
  • company has NEVER missed earnings expectations in its history as a public company (!)
  • highest gross operating margin in the biz 44.6%
  • all quantitative measures of management quality much higher than comps:
Management Effectiveness (%) v.s. comp
Net Profit Margin (TTM) 0.10 0.04
Net Profit Margin - 5 Yr Avg 11.60 5.10
Return on Assets (TTM) 11.90 4.50
Return on Assets - 5 Yr Avg 14.20 5.90
Return on Investment (TTM) 14.20 6.50
Return on Investment - 5 Yr Avg 17.50 8.40
Efficiency v.s. comps
Revenue/Employee (TTM) 477,242.00 169,078.00
Net Income/Employee (TTM) 48,797.00 6,910.00
Receivable Turnover (TTM) 3.50 6.30
Inventory Turnover (TTM) 2.50 3.00
Asset Turnover (TTM) 1.20 1.20

  • VERY high inside ownership 62% with some low level insider buying November 2007
  • trading 33% below 52 week high
  • global footprint in 73 countries
  • expanding in North America with its own retail outlet stores, carefully avoiding overlap with the whole sale customer base
  • it looks like a colder winter than usual is upon us... this often predicts better than usual earnings in the short term (global warming- bah! humbug! ;-) )

Saturday, December 1, 2007

A few comments on digging through the garbage can

Looking through the trash for discarded treasures is what value investors do. The retail and financial sectors are highly reviled amongst Wall Street mavens. With many good economic reasons for the US consumer to go in to torpor looming, it seems that these businesses should be avoided at all costs because their short and possibly intermediate term outlook looks miserable.

Booms and busts are finite by definition. To capture the recovery, a value investor needs to buy in the most hostile environment BEFORE the market accounts for the potential for recovery into the stock price. This effect almost always happens months before the actual recovery occurs as the "smart money" (institutions) knows the business cycle better than anyone. The edge that the retail investor has over the institutional one is that he can hold these positions for a prolonged period of time without answering to impatient clients and marketing divisions demanding short term results at the expense of long term gains.

Features of companies that will endure the economic storms and emerge stronger than before (the competition crushed) include those with an MARGIN OF SAFETY demonstrated by a stock price that is trading below a company's intrinsic value. Intrinsic value is unfortunately largely subjective regardless of the fancy mathematical modeling some analysts use to calculate the number. IMHO it's best to convince yourself of the strengths of the company as if you were thinking like a company owner-

You'd want a company with a:
  1. strong balance sheet
  2. strong cash flow
  3. manageable or no debt
  4. dividend that is sustainable, yet compensates for inflationary bite out of the ROI over time
  5. strong brand
  6. wide economic moat (i.e. no or weak competition and a high barrier to entry for other potential competitors)
  7. experienced effective management with a track record during prior market slow downs
  8. global footprint (arguable these days as the international markets seem to move in lockstep)

Wednesday, November 28, 2007

A rare balanced view of this month's market from seekingalpha.com

most of the commentators on this site are traders with very short term views. This fellow is the exception:

Anyone else feel like they are in the 10th round of a heavyweight bout - and losing? If you are long stocks, the answer is almost definitely yes. That's how it feels during a correction. As the screaming media won't let us forget today, yesterday we crossed the magical "down 10% from the highs" point that officially means we are in a correction. Funny thing is, by definition, if it is a correction, it must be correct - right?


Personally, I feel like it's an IN-correction, and I know I'm not alone. Sure certain sectors of the market are/were due for a smack-down. The irony is that in corrections like we are currently experiencing, the wrong stuff goes down. The cheap companies get even cheaper, and whatever has been working gets even more expensive. The psychological phenomena at work are known as recency bias and/or extrapolation. People tend to put too much emphasis on recent data points, and tend to extrapolate recent trends into the future. Nobody wants to touch the cheap stuff - it's the old "don't catch a falling knife" syndrome. This all works fine until it doesn't. For now, if you're piling into what's going up, you are doing better short-term, than those of us looking long-term and trying to pick up good companies on the cheap. As David Merkel said:
Absurdity is like infinity. Twice infinity is still infinity. Twice absurd is still absurd. Absurd valuations, whether high or low, can become even more absurd if the expectations of market participants become momentum-based. Momentum investors do not care about valuation; they buy what is going up, and sell what is going down.
The market is big-time scared right now. Look at treasuries. My officemate trades treasuries for a living and he cannot believe the fear and related "flight to quality" he is seeing. The market is buying treasuries no matter how expensive they become, and fleeing the stuff that is really cheap (financials, retail, etc). The 10-year has hit its lowest yield in more than three years, around 3.9%. The 2-yr's discount to Fed-funds is the greatest it's been since 2000.
Other factors are at work too. Many big Wall Street firms end their years this month, and bonuses are on the line. Hence you can bet that they are dumping losers for tax losses and window-dressing as well by buying winners to try and eke out some last minute performance.
We already know that US equity mutual funds have seen large asset outflows as investors tire of taking the pain and either flee to safety (cash, treasuries) or reinvest in overseas funds. Now, we get the news that big pension funds are dumping US equities and moving into international funds too. We are talking about institutions that collectively control more than $500 Billion of assets! For example, Calpers, at $250B, recently decided at a board meeting that they could enhance returns by moving assets into international funds, decreasing US weighting from 40% to 24%, its lowest weighting in more than 20 years. Other big funds are following suit.
Here's some news for you: Pension funds are not the "smart money", even if they are the big money. Just ask Mr. Buffett (how could I write something without quoting him?). In December 2001 in Fortune he wrote the following (I have tried to limit how much I reprint here, so please read the article for more):
In 1971--this was Nifty Fifty time--pension managers, feeling great about the market, put more than 90% of their net cash flow into stocks, a record commitment at the time. And then, in a couple of years, the roof fell in and stocks got way cheaper. So what did the pension fund managers do? They quit buying because stocks got cheaper!
That sort of behavior is especially puzzling when engaged in by pension fund managers, who by all rights should have the longest time horizon of any investors...Yet they behave just like rank amateurs (getting paid, though, as if they had special expertise).
In 1979, when I felt stocks were a screaming buy, I wrote in an article, "Pension fund managers continue to make investment decisions with their eyes firmly fixed on the rear-view mirror. This generals-fighting-the-last -war approach has proved costly in the past and will likely prove equally costly this time around.
I continue to believe that there are many excellent companies out there selling for bargain prices, and I continue to add holdings in retail, financial and other beaten down areas as my subscribers can see. In the near term this has largely been an exercise in masochism. Remember I am trading my own money here as well as my clients'. Yet, amazingly, I am not yet kicking the dog or gazing expectantly at the open (3rd story) window behind my desk. It's not the first time I've been through this, and I have conviction in my investment process and my holdings.
For those fellow Investment Directors whose Vestopia performance records start near the all-time high for the market in October like mine, things may look grim even if we are outperforming the market. Let me say right here that although the daily performance calculation is a necessary evil, never will I do something to try and window-dress my short-term results at the expense of the long-term.
Quoting Legg Mason's thoughtful Investment Strategist, Michael Mauboussin:
We argue that there is an approach that distances the best performers in all probabilistic fields from the average participant...
1. A focus on process vs. outcome
2. A constant search for favorable odds, including a recognition of risk.
3. An understanding of the role of time.
..the ability to stick with these elements in the face of the market's vicissitudes and the crowd's tugs is very difficult - and ultimately all about temperament.
Amen.

Sunday, November 25, 2007

Tips and tricks for the value investor

some of these lessons I've learned from the school of hard knocks.

  • never buy on a stock tip, even if it's from a guru. Do your own research. Buy with conviction. "I never attempt to make money on the stock market. I buy on the assumption that they could close the market the next day and not reopen it for five years." Warren Buffett
  • do check to see what the gurus are buying and selling and see if you can understand why they are seeing value where the market does not. I use www.gurufocus.com. Do NOT blindly follow the gurus, however. They are dealing in the billions of dollars and many excellent prospects for the smaller investor are not suitable for them and vice versa.
  • generally, ignore analysts' ratings of stocks. They generally upgrade stocks that are going up and downgrade stocks that are dropping--- they are too late to the party. Morningstar's security ratings and assessment of intrinsic value are definitely worth paying attention to, however. www.morningstar.com. (unlike the other links here, this one isn't free for full service)
  • generally, stockbrokers know the price of everything and the value of nothing. The are remunerated when you buy and sell a lot so they are motivated to involve you in short term, speculative investments based on momentum. This exposes you to the whims of a madman (Benjamin Graham's "Mr. Market"), something that is not nearly as important over the long term.
  • do not buy on valuation alone. Most stocks that have a low P/E and P/B ratio do so for good reasons-- usually low growth (check out the PEG ratio too). Always compare valuation to the competitors and see if you can figure out why the market has punished the stock. If the reason is irrational or short term, it MIGHT be a buying opportunity.
  • If you're considering buying shares of a company always read a transcript of the last quarter's conference call and the last year end Q4 call (available at www.seekingalpha.com). If you don't have time to read the whole thing (who does?) ignore the opening comments (mostly hype) and just read the CFO's report and the Q & A section at the end. The CFO is not a salesman like the CEO and COO, so he/she gives the straight stuff. If it's US based company, execs can go to jail for longer than Canada puts our murderers away if they present something misleading so don't be put off if they seem cautious--- wouldn't you be? They shouldn't be evasive without stating a good reason for being so. After reading the transcripts you should be able to understand two things: how the company earns it's $ and how it plans to increase those earnings in the future.
  • When you look at financial reports always compare the statement of cash flows to the earnings. If earnings are increasing and cash flows are not, get nervous. There are legit reasons for this phenomenon; however, they should be easy to find. If you can't figure it out, ask the investor relations dude. If you still don't understand (in plain english), sell!
  • ignore technical analysts/chart readers. Pseudoscience substituting for momentum investing. I don't know any rich chartists.
  • if everyone is talking about a stock or you read about it in the newspaper, you're too late to the party. Far greater minds have probed it's every nook and cranny and the market has evaluated it long ago.
  • if you want to invest in a sector and you don't have the time or energy to research it yourself, buy an ETF with the lowest management expense ratio you can find. I prefer fundamentally indexed ETFs (as opposed to those indexed by market cap, as the majority are). An objective easy-to-read summary of ETFs is here.
  • Don't over-diversify, despite what you read in the financial mags. "Wide diversification is only required when investors do not understand what they are doing. " Warren Buffett
  • If you feel a sickening feel in your stomach when you buy value stocks (particularly after they fall even further...) and everyone else you know is selling when you are buying, then you are finally getting the idea... :-)
  • if the market is volatile--- buy your stake in 25% portions-- hopefully on the way to the bottom. If the market is moving "sideways" save brokerage fees by buying all at once
  • dividends DO matter. really high yields may be unsustainable--- check the "payout ratio". if it's > 50% of the retained earnings, be wary. if a company has otherwise good balance sheets and has been increasing dividends regularly (even from a modest amount) I find this more reassuring than a large dividend yield in a shaky company
  • do not buy a company with the latest technological breakthrough, no matter how impressive. Focus on companies that know how to sell product and make money from it by controlling their costs, managing their debts and beefing up their margins. (look at Dell-- not the best innovator and definite not the first big PC manufacturer... but if you bought $10,000 worth of shares in the late 80's, you'd be a millionaire now).
  • try to choose companies with products that don't become obsolete for a long time i.e. Cemex. Cement doesn't change much year to year, lol. Inventory management is a perpetual nightmare, particularly with tech products and vehicles. Companies that manage their inventories well maintain and increase their margins which pretty much always translates into the bottom line.

Saturday, November 24, 2007

Of blind squirrels and flying pigs...






Link to article here

if you don't have time to read the whole article, the points are summarized here:

  • Economists cannot predict the turning points in the economy. Of the forty-eight predictions made by economists, forty-six missed the turning points.
  • Economists’ forecasting skill is about as good as guessing. For example, even the economists who directly or indirectly run the economy—the Federal Reserve, the Council of Economic Advisors and the Congressional Budget—had forecasting records that were worse than pure chance.
  • There are no economic forecasters who consistently lead the pack in forecasting accuracy.
  • There are no economic ideologies whose adherents produce consistently superior economic forecasts.
  • Increased sophistication provides no improvement in economic forecasting accuracy.
  • Consensus forecasts offer little improvement.
  • Forecasts may be affected by psychological bias. Some economists are perpetually optimistic and others perpetually pessimistic.(1)

Since the underlying basis of most stock market forecasts is an economic forecast, the evidence suggests that stock market strategists who predict bull and bear markets will have no greater success than do the economists.

Benjamin Graham--- Warren's prof. From The Stingy Investor.com




stocks selected by Graham's Simple Way gained an average of 26.6% over the last year which bests a 20.8% advance for the S&P500 as represented by the SPY exchange-traded fund. (In both cases dividends are included but not reinvested.) That's an outperformance of 5.8 percentage points for the Simple Way. Since 2005 Graham's method did even better with a 54.0% gain that outpaced the SPY fund by 19.8 percentage points. Not bad for a technique that has been around for more than 40 years.

Graham's Simple Way is based on two main criteria.

First, stocks must have an earnings yield that is at least twice as large as the average yield on long-term AAA corporate bonds. Furthermore, Graham thought investors should not buy stocks with earnings yields of less than 10%.

Earnings yield is the reciprocal of the more common price-to-earnings ratio. Instead of dividing price by earnings, as you do for P/E ratios, earnings yield is found by dividing earnings by price and the result shown as a percentage. So, if a stock earned $1 per share last year and is trading at $20 per share then its earnings yield would be 5% (i.e. $1 / $20 * 100%).

The average yield on AAA 20-year U.S. corporate bonds was 6.01% on June 1, 2007. So, according to the Simplest Way a stock is cheap if it has an earnings yield of more than 12.02% (or a positive P/E ratio of less than 8.32).

Graham's second requirement focused on safety by demanding that companies have little debt. He stuck to stocks with leverage ratios (the ratio of total assets to shareholder's equity) of two or less. Although low-debt firms are relatively safe, it is important to remember that there is no such thing as a totally safe stock.

When it came to selling, Graham suggested waiting for either a 50% profit or no later than the end of the second calendar year after purchase. I differ from Graham in that I'm willing to let my winners run three years minimum. However, Graham's admonition to trim one's losers is good to keep in mind. Nonetheless, to make performance calculations less onerous, I assume that stocks are held between articles (which appear about once a year) and are then replaced by new stocks.

This year Graham's criteria narrowed the large universe of stocks down to 179. But I decided to focus on U.S. stocks with market capitalizations of more than $500 million (down from a billion dollars last year), which are shown in Table 1. Even after including a few smaller stocks, the list is down to 11 stocks this year from 22 last year.

When looking at the list, you should keep in mind that some stocks will inevitably fair poorly. For instance, the biggest dog from last year was Louisiana-Pacific Corp (LPX) which lost 16.9%. Indeed, 7 of the 22 stocks from last year lost money. While losses were more than made up for by big gains elsewhere, owning a portfolio of value stocks can be stressful for some investors.




Thursday, November 22, 2007

Feeling Moody? MCO-- a classic value play


This is a core Buffet holding and is a highly hated company these days---> scapegoated for the subprime housing disaster. Spurious lawsuits are being launched v.s. Moody's by institutional investors along these lines of thinking.

I love it when this happens. This kind of emotional overlay provides an opportunity to inexpensively buy a company that deserves to be very expensive:

1. is over 100 years old and mid-large cap.
2. has one of the highest long term profit margins, ROIC and ROA in any publically listed company in US history suggesting consistently superb management.
3. is one company of a duopoly (S & P is the other). This provides a WIDE economic moat due to the high barrier to entry. Recent attempts to legislate a change to this situation have failed.
4. has a global footprint.
5. is buying back its own stock aggressively.
6. has no operating debt and lots of cash in the bank

This article by Yarnell "Thinking like a Business Owner" says it better than I can:

Moody’s: a case study

To find a great franchise that is currently out of favor, one need look no farther than to the center of the storm raging in the credit markets. Founded in 1900, Moody’s (MCO) has a dominant and durable franchise as a member of the credit rating oligopoly that reigns supreme in the growing global fixed-income market. The credit rating business has high barriers to entry by virtue of both its required government designation and the well entrenched positions of its participants established over many decades. Moody’s essentially collects a royalty on the growth of the capital markets. This powerful and well managed franchise demonstrates superior economic characteristics in terms of high return on equity, high profit margins and low capital requirements resulting in reasonably predictable owner earnings. Moody’s generates substantial free cash flow which its management is sensibly using to repurchase its shares.

It is easy to extol the virtues of Moody’s, but one must consider any potential risks as well. Facing the prospect of legal challenges and legislative changes in the wake of the credit crisis, the business is viewed by some as vulnerable to a fundamental change. However, given that all the participants in the industry face the same challenges, there is no readily available alternative, and over any meaningful period of time the bond market that fuels the global economy will undoubtedly grow (even if it experiences a temporary setback), Moody’s franchise will remain relatively unscathed.

Given Moody’s reasonably predictable profits, it is possible to place a reasonable estimate on its intrinsic value. Last year Moody’s generated about $700 million in owner earnings and in 2004 it generated about $500 million in owner earnings. Owner earnings have grown about 25% compounded annually over about the last 10 years. The next ten years will not see that level of growth. A more conservative estimate of Moody’s value involves going back to the 2004 estimate of owner earnings as a base, using 10% for the rate of growth in those earnings and choosing a 9% discount rate, one arrives at a discounted present value of about $15 billion. If one uses a growth rate of 15%, then one arrives at discounted present value of over $18 billion. The current market value of the company is just under $12 billion. Therefore, one can purchase one of the strongest business franchises in the world for a price reasonably below a conservative estimate of its intrinsic value. Even if the fundamentals of the company weaken in response to the current credit crisis, the margin of safety in the purchase will mitigate against permanent loss of capital. This makes Moody’s a company worth owning at a price worth paying. It is not surprising that Moody’s is currently out of fashion.

If the price of the company weakens, whether in response to the credit situation, general market conditions or any other reason, it may present an opportunity to own more of a great company. The business-like investor can build wealth over time by accumulating great companies at increasingly attractive prices.

The author owns shares of the company mentioned in this article.

I plan to bid for some MCO shares over the next few days. I think that a margin of safety exists making this a good long term bet. I'll hold it for 3 years before losing my patience with this investment.

l

Tuesday, November 20, 2007

more on the US greenback

Derek Decloet's G&M article

Some general comments and Cemex CX--- a bull's perspective from Motley Fool's CAPS

The US and Global markets remain in free fall mode. Rather than panic, the savvy investor needs to focus his/her search for buying opportunities that may not come along again. These kind of market conditions tend to weed out competition with weaker balance sheets and poor management strategies. When the market eventually cycles back (however long that takes), the strong, well managed company emerges with a greater market share and is positioned to take advantage of the rebound in growth and investor confidence.

I've been a fan of CX for some time. It's hardly an "unknown" company but I do believe it has been unfairly discounted by the housing debacle. Investors have taken an indiscriminate flight away from any stock that has the word "housing" associated with it.

I started buying CX at $31 and have bought stocks in small quantities all the way down to $25. As I free up some more cash, I intend to add to my position gradually. I hope it drops to the low 20's!

An extensive and well-thought out analysis below from ACMPartnersip (sic), a CAPS member on the Motley Fool:

At today's prices CX offers incredible value, with a forward earnings yield of roughly 13%. CX's global reach, best in class management team, strong free cash flow generation, high quality assets, and low cost structure should represent just a few of the reasons why shares' today represent considerable opportunity. Current concerns relating to the U.S. housing slowdown (for some reason U.S. investors use CX as a vehicle to play U.S. housing even though U.S.Housing probably represents less than 10% of 2006 EBITDA), as well as the fact that it is domiciled in Mexico (CX appears to be excessively discounted do to this) have unfairly punished the stock over the last few months. Cemex has a long-running record of using the steady and substantial cash flows from its mexican operations to support the cheap debt necessary to opportunistically aquire competitors around the globe. With Mexican population centers largely landlocked, CX has captured 50% of the market. And becasue self construction is so prevalent, the brand has developed a substantial brand and distribution advantage, which allows for prolific margins on bagged cement. This outsized profitability, coupled with the increasingly oligopolistic nature of the industry should lead CX shareholders to market smashing returns for years to come. My estimate of intrinsic value, sits conservatively 40% above today's prices with additional upside likely as uncertainty over various issues (such as the recent Rinker aquisition) begins to disappear over the next few quarters.

Company Overview, History, Industry and Management Analysis:

CX's world class management team, highly profitable domestic market, and it's ability to generate strong amounts of free cash, has allowed the company to build itself from a small domestic player into a global powerhouse (currently the third largest player in the global cement industry). CX's assets would be nearly impossible to replicate for a variety of reasons, and its outsized profits are protected from significant competitive threats due to poweful barriers to entry fundamental to the industry itself. Reason's include...

Transport costs act as a significant barrier to entry in the cement industy, especially for incumbents in geographically protected markets. Cement is a low value to weight product, therefore competition and demand drivers are mainly local, generally restricted to 100-150 miles. It is hard to import/export cement because of transportation cost, humidity, and the need of port infrastructure and grinding facilities. As a consequence, global trading accounts for only 7% of consumption worldwide.

The majors...Cemex, La Farge, and Holcim control most of the global trading, which is important in the U.S where imports represented 24% of consumption in 2006. Waterborne transportation remains the cheapest way to transport cement, but with tight ship supply and escalating fuel costs, this source has become considerably less profitable in recent years...and due to CX's proximity to the U.S., this trend has and will continue to improve their competitive position vs. their primary rivals who suffer a distinct disadvantage in serving the world's most lucrative market.

In the cement industry, the cost structure at both the cement plant as well as the distribution level is vitally important, and CX is a leader in both thanks to its flexible energy strategy and advanced logistical capabilities. Their flexible energy strategy and logistic capabilities determine their baseline economics (ex. If production costs are lower in another region, and assuming transport costs don't chew up the difference, the disparity can be profitably arbitraged).

An example of Cemex's savvy management as well as one of its unique competitive advantages can be seen in its use of petroleum coke. Energy accounts for close to half of cement production costs. CX reduces its oil and gas exposure (i.e. its risk) by substituting petroleum coke, a lower cost and less volatile source of fuel. Therefore CX, on top of its geographic proximity to the United States, has yet another strategic advantage concerning the global cement trade...it not only has to spend less on fuel (simply because it doesn't have to travel nearly as far as its competitors), it's fuel is actually cheaper and more efficient than its rivals.

Another barrier to trade involves government intervention, often in the form of quotas or tariffs. In fact, currently CX is a prime beneficiary of the unwinding of one such situation. The U.S. and Mexican governments negotiated a reduction and eventual elimination of long-standing limits on Mexican cement imports. Because U.S. demand has long outstripped domestic supply, Asian and other plants have filled the gap (another reason why trade is disproportionately important in the U.S.). If CX is successful in supplanting a portion of this business from its Asian competition with mexican cement, the additional volume and attendant operating leverage could yield quite a significant windfall not included in my fair value estimation.

Essentially, in developed countries, it has been very difficult to expand supply due to the difficulty in getting the environmental license and permits for new quarries and plants. Holcim, for example, gave up on a plant expansion in the U.S. after many years of unfruitful efforts. In developing countries, most cement is consumed by the informal economy through the sale of bags (vs. bulk). Clients are generally very small and distribution and brand become strong barriers to entry (commonsensically, margins are typically higher in developed countries). In summary, the combination of high transportation costs, licensing/permit restrictions, pulverized distribution and oligopilistic behavior present strong barriers to competition in the cement business.

Additional Pertinent Points:

Cemex is diversified across geographies and up and down the value chain, selling cement, aggregates, and concrete

Rapid infrastructure investments in developing countries have soaked up industry supply and created a favorable supply/demand environment

Repeat-buyer programs, online ordering, and a flexible, one time concrete delivery network (all aimed at increasing reocurring revenue as well as "stickyness") are just a few examples of Cemex's unrivaled service, for which customers are often willing to pay a premium

International expansion has been the hallmark of Cemex's strategy for decades: By employing centralized thinking (the Cemex way!), and leveraging operational practices across all markets, CX has been able to quickly implement "best practices" within newly aquired companies. Historically, this has lead to an immediate improvement in the newly aquired company's operations, leading to increased profitability, and substantial cost savings over time as they benifit from CX's scale and expertise.

CX management has an outstanding record of intelligently allocating capital, and is not hesitant to make big up-front investments that may hurt near term results, but will add value over the long term. Management also has a stellar record of talent development (providing a deep bench). Additionally, similar to many legendary companies such as WMT, management places a large premium on information flow: an intranet connects all offices and plants for real time data sharing

CX benefits from significant tax advantages as well. Loopholes in the mexican tax system (which have in some respects been eliminated recently) for multinational corporations have benefited CX to a meaningful degree over its history. An example of this is that many of their international companies have R&D expenses paid to its Switzerland subsidiary, where R&D is not taxed. The overall effect can be seen in their accounting tax rate of 17% in 2007 of which only 11% are related to cash taxes.

Although such tax advantages may seem like a win-win situation, it actually presents a few problems for the company... primarily being that as things currently stand it makes no sense for management to pay dividends or buy back stock, since this would be taxed at a full tax rate. This underlying truth goes along way in explaining why CX, a cash flow machine, needs to use its cash in aquisitions to avoid worsening its capital structure and tax planning. The good thing is, and in contrast to most companies over time, management has created significant value in each of their major aquisitions. There ability to integrate and implement their best practices quickly and effectively across newly aquired organizations has typically resulted in results (ROIC) of 200-300bps above its cost of capital. Pretty impressive....

Catalysts:

The first likely catalyst is Increasing pricing power due to the strong reduction in imports and the oligopolistic nature of the sector. The recent and sizable price increase in U.S.cement should start to land on Wall Streets radar within the next few quarters...

Cost cutting and stable/improving pricing has mitigated much of the downward earnings pressure from recent volume declines within the U.S. market. Even with today's incredibly poor demand environment, it is worth noting that CX's U.S. operating margin was still a very respectable 17%. While I expect further declines within the U.S. market in the short term, this should be offset by higher prices for cement and aggregates coupled with yet to be realized synergies from the Rinker aquisition (in this unique case, CX management's past track record of success gives me confidence in their ability to deliver exactly what they say they will)...propping up U.S. earnings. Cemex's global diversification is also critical at this juncture, as Cemex has recently (as of last quarter) increased operating profits in all of its other markets outside of the U.S. and U.K.

Another likely catalyst...current negotiations with CRH regarding the divestiture of certain assets in the U.S.

di-worse-if-cation (Diversification) Article by Michael Dawson

Not a day goes by that I don’t hear a talking head on CNBC talking about a well diversified portfolio.

Back to HOG and Nordstrom

New buying opportunity: Harley's stock has dropped to $46 on the general market pullback (recession discount?). Simultaneously, one of HOG's insiders just bought $5 Million worth of Harley shares...

We may have missed the window of opportunity for Nordstrom. See this article. The market has come to its senses regarding its temporary undervaluing of this stock.

Friday, November 16, 2007

Banco Popular-- BPOP-- The bull case

By far the dominant bank in Puerto Rico, even more so since the downturn in the financial sector has crushed the local Savings & Loan competition. The company provides brokerage, insurance, and consumer lending services. It operates through four main subsidiaries: Popular Puerto Rico, Banco Popular North, Popular Financial Holdings and EVERTEC, a data-processing unit.
strong balance sheet:
BPOP v.s. Industry average
P/E Ratio (TTM) 9.40 1.10
P/E High - Last 5 Yrs 17.70 16.60
P/E Low - Last 5 Yrs 9.10 6.70
Price to Book (MRQ) 0.74 3.81
Price to Tangible Book (MRQ) 0.94 4.30
Price to Cash Flow (TTM) 8.00 9.60
Price to Free Cash Flow (TTM) 8.90 21.60
(note: the P:FCF ratio is the critical fundamental for assessing a bank's potential for survival during economic downturns)

Great Dividend yield 6.9%

Stock price off 50% from it's 52 week high.

Off 69% from 5 year high of $29 (current price $9)

admirable net margin (5 year avg) 14.4% vs. 12% for industry

EV/EBIDTA <10 suggesting an attractive takeover target

Insiders are buying shares during the decline from $17-->10

Gurus are buying shares: Brandes bought at 18.5. Pzena bought at 17.5.

Leverage is less than peers: BPOP Industry Avg
LT Debt to Equity (MRQ) 2.30 v.s. 3.77
Total Debt to Equity (MRQ) 3.26 v.s. 4.03

Wednesday, November 14, 2007

Time to be brave now...

The deep value stocks are in the most unloved business sectors. What is unloved more now than US financial companies? The subprime mortgage "crisis" and sinking greenback has only added to investor angst.

Many of these downtrodden stocks are now trading considerably below their book values-- a phenomenon not seen since 1990.

The secret to determining which companies will survive the downturn and then be valued fairly by the market (approximating their intrinsic value) is to find examples where:

  1. leverage and interest coverage is less than competitors
  2. credit write-downs (current and future) are less than competitors or factored into current share price
  3. free cash flow is greater than competitors
  4. there is a competitive advantage either through scale (i.e. Bank of America) or geographic monopoly/oligopoly (i.e. Banco Popular)
  5. are small to mid cap companies that are not house-hold names (often ignored by traders, particularly during tough economic times)
  6. have a dividend yield greater than or equal to the inflation rate so that you are paid to wait up to three years for the market to recognize the company's value or for the sector to rotate into favour by the "big money" or "smart money" (institutional investors).

Next post, I'll look at one company that I've been adding to my position: BPOP

l

Tuesday, November 13, 2007

Another well written article from the Globe and Mail

Look stupid. Be brave.

From Tuesday's Globe and Mail

Stock markets are designed to make smart people feel stupid, to take money from the fearful and hand it to the brave.

The last time the United States went through a major financial crisis, in the early 1990s, property markets on the West Coast were rocked.

Just like today, investors went running from the banks most exposed to worst-hit areas. San Francisco's Wells Fargo & Co., with its huge book of loans in California, was in dire straits. Or so people said. In the span of a few months it plunged 40 per cent; it was described as a "dead duck" and thought to be a possible bankruptcy candidate. Into the maw of pessimism stepped a well-known and very rich investor, who bought millions of shares. But still it kept falling.

Ah, well, sneered a columnist in Barron's, at least the guy "won't have to worry about who spends his fortune much longer; not if he keeps trying to pick a bottom in bank stocks." The investor? Rumpled old man from Nebraska, goes by the name of Buffett. And he did pretty well on his investment in Wells Fargo.

Like every other bank, Wells has been bruised in Wall Street's Black November. It's one of the lucky ones, since half the U.S. financial sector is in a body cast.

When an analyst at a major brokerage house speculates openly about the potential bankruptcy of the firm across the street, as Citigroup's Prashant Bhatia did yesterday with E*Trade Financial Corp., you know we are in the middle of an unusual time - the kind of market in which the brave inevitably look stupid for a while, but end up making a killing.

E*Trade's fall is stunning. In 1999, at the peak of the Internet lunacy, it was (very) briefly worth more than the Bank of Montreal. Now it's worth less than little Canadian Western Bank. Not five months ago, two hedge funds asked - no, demanded - Ed Clark to get out of the way and let TD Ameritrade, the Toronto-Dominion Bank's partly-owned U.S. brokerage, merge with E*Trade. Since then, the latter has lost about $8-billion in market capitalization. Where are the hedge fund geniuses now? Awfully quiet.

But the reasons for E*Trade's implosion - regardless of whether it goes bust - are the same reasons to be bullish on the U.S. financial sector. The company's big problem was management's decision to diversify away from what it was good at (online trading) into what it was demonstrably not good at (lending money).

Last year, its banking subsidiary wrote off about $45-million (U.S.) in bad loans; this year, it will be $338-million, Mr. Bhatia predicts, rising to $400-million in 2008. It's knee deep in toxic debt and management's credibility is shot. If it survives, the memory of its mistakes will linger.

So E*Trade's days as an aggressive lender are over, as it becomes the latest in a parade of financial institutions to pull back - even the big ones. HSBC Holdings PLC, the massive global bank, closed some of its subprime lending operations in the U.S. Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. did likewise. Bank of America Corp. is chopping jobs in its corporate and investment bank. Citigroup Inc., which is in disarray, may break itself up or close or sell divisions. At the least, it's will have to become far more cautious as it rebuilds its wafer-thin capital base.

It's the same dynamic Mr. Buffett took advantage of in the early nineties with his Wells Fargo play. Then, as now, the weakest competitors died or went away, which, in any business, including banking, tends to mean higher costs to the customer and higher margins to the survivor.

The yield curve is also changing. U.S. banks typically make money by borrowing short term and lending longer term. The U.S. Federal Reserve is responding to the current crisis by cutting short-term rates (that is, banks' funding costs will fall). But the rate banks can charge for longer-term loans is higher, because credit spreads are wider.

That can only mean good things for bank profits. So why has the world gone so negative on Wall Street? Why do most of the really excellent banks in the world's largest economy sell for 10 or 11 times earnings, and Citigroup and B of A have yields around 6 per cent?

There are two reasons. The first is that the mortgage mess is not over. But the second is what Bill Miller, the famed mutual fund manager at Legg Mason, might describe as predictable, but illogical, market psychology.

Studies repeatedly show investors place too much weight on information that's (a) recent, and (b) dramatic. The multibillion mortgage writedowns at U.S. banks are both.

Mr. Miller, who beat the Standard & Poor's 500 for an incredible 15 consecutive years, has been getting enthusiastic lately about U.S. financial stocks. At the moment, he looks foolish and stupid. Two years from now, he'll be thought of as brave and wise.

ddecloet@globeandmail.com

US retail stocks are getting cheap

read this article for the details: Barrons on retail stocks

I'm particularly interested in the luxury brands retailers as long term holds. Nordstroms is an excellent example. Well managed company with some of the highest margins in the biz. P/E ratio is near 5 year lows and balance sheet is better than competitors.

I'd watch the stock price carefully as it's a heavily shorted stock currently and may be subject to a "short squeeze" which would push up the stock price only temporarily. Wait for the price to settle, preferably in the low 30's.

l

Sunday, November 11, 2007

Buffett On Mr. Market

by Joe Ponzio

People are always asking me about "must read" books on business, investing, and other topics to help with their investing. One of the finest "Buffett" books on the market is Lawrence Cunningham's The Essays of Warren Buffett: Lessons for Corporate America. Unlike most books that try to pick apart Buffett's investment style, The Essays of Warren Buffett organizes Buffett's annual letters, reports, and other teachings in an easy-to-read format.

If you are not entirely, 100%, unwaveringly confident in your investing, buy this book. Let's take a look at what Buffett has said about Mr. Market.

On Buying Stocks

Whenever Charlie and I buy common stocks...we approach the transaction as if we were buying into a private business. We look at the economic prospects of the business, the people in charge of running it, and the price we must pay. We do not have in mind any time or price for sale.

The intrinsic value of a company lies entirely in its future. Don't just look at the economic past of the business; try to predict the future by looking at the economic prospects of the business. In addition, take a look at management. Mr. Market will present you with thousands of opportunities to buy businesses when they appear to be on sale. Bad or unethical management can do a lot of things to screw up the prospects of the business.

Meet Mr. Market

Ben Graham, my friend and teacher, long ago described the mental attitude toward market fluctuations that I believe most conducive to investment success. He said that you should imagine market quotations as coming from a remarkably accommodating fellow named Mr. Market who is your partner in a private business. Without fail, Mr. Market appears daily and names a price at which he will either buy your interest or sell you his.

On Uncertainty and Stock Prices: Buffett and Pabrai Come Together

Here is where you see a screaming correlation between Mohnish Pabrai and Warren Buffett:

Even though the business that the two of you own may have economic characteristics that are stable, Mr. Market's quotations will be anything but. For, sad to say, the poor fellow has incurable emotional problems. At times he feels euphoric and can see only the favorable factors affecting the business. When in that mood, he names a very high buy-sell price because he fears that you will snap up his interest and rob him of imminent gains. At other times he is depressed and can see nothing but trouble ahead for both the business and the world. On these occasions he will name a very low price, since he is terrified that you will unload your interest on him.

Mohnish Pabrai speaks often of high risk vs. high uncertainty (with low risk). One example of this was Buffett's purchase of American Express in 1964. At the time, American Express saw its stock clobbered in the markets after it revealed that it lost millions when it bought salad oil that turned out to be nothing more than water.

The world was selling American Express, and Buffett was buying - ultimately investing 41% of his partnership's assets into the company. Mr. Market panicked, saw nothing but doom and gloom, and priced the $400-$500 million business at $100 million.

Buffett On American Express

...Easy does it. After 25 years of buying and supervising a great variety of businesses, Charlie [Munger] and I have not learned how to solve difficult business problems. What we have learned is how to avoid them.

He goes on to say:

...[In some instances] a great investment opportunity occurs when a marvelous business encounters a one-time huge, but solvable, problem as was the case many years back at both American Express and GEICO.

Look For "Debacles"

In the current sub-prime debacle, a lot of builders, banks and mortgage companies have seen their stocks tank. This presents some seemingly "mouth-watering" investment opportunities. Now the question: Which of these companies are in real trouble, and which have encountered a one-time huge, but solvable, problem?

Mr. Market will beat up the businesses that won't survive; Mr. Market will also throw in a few that he doesn't know how to handle.

The market may ignore business success for a while, but eventually will confirm it. As Ben said: "In the short run, the market is a voting machine but in the long run it is a weighing machine."

Saturday, November 10, 2007

Why I buy American


  1. Loonie is at a 130 year high v.s. the US dollar. We're by definition long term investors... how long do you think that will last? The largest economy in the world (although China is closing in) and the largest manufacturing smoke-stack apparatus the globe has ever seen, backed by a low greenback = strong exports and improving trade deficit. The US trade deficit has already improved over the past 12 months.
  2. IMHO, US public companies have the most reliable and conservatively stated financial information in their reports. The Sarbanes-Oxley legislation introduced in 2002 (created from the Enron/World.com hangover) has tightened the noose around the CEO/CFO's collective necks regarding disclosure. Eliot Spitzer has made his impact as well. There many examples of US executives getting 20+ year jail sentences for fraud... can you remember the last time a Canadian or European executive went to jail? Even overt criminal examples such as Bre-X have gone unpunished in my country.
  3. Finally, many folks have gone broke by shorting consumer driven companies. Never under-estimate the US consumer.

l

Thursday, November 8, 2007

GGC

GGC's Q3 conference call demonstrated to me that the management is using cost containment strategies very well. Operating income improved from Q2 in an increasingly hostile economic environment, mostly from the Royal Group output.

The stock price is in free fall right now--- looks like I got in a bit early, lol. Despite this, I don't think it's a "falling knife". Stock bottoms are impossible to predict and over the long term usually make a minimal impact on ROI.

I plan to sit on my investment for 18 months-3 years unless management or fundamentals deteriorate.

Next week or so, I plan to discuss two large cap stocks that I own and am planning to buy more of: Staples SPLS and Cemex CX. I believe that these companies are both exceedingly well managed and undervalued due to being in unloved sectors currently. The margin of safety for investment in these is considerably higher than GGC.



l

Sunday, November 4, 2007

The bear case for GGC

  1. decreasing demand in US (v.s. Canada) associated with housing slow down
  2. Royal Group acquisition risks: integration problems (potential in any acquisition) and big time debt (see below)
  3. Earnings and operating income dropping quarter after quarter, despite reduced costs.
  4. Debt:Equity ratio 3.9 (mostly long term debt) and current ratio 1.3-- the former very high for industry, the latter suggesting some margin of safety.
  5. Market cap only 360 M, increasing overall risk.

Monday, October 29, 2007

Georgia Gulf Corp GGC


The bull case:

  1. 20+ year old major North American producer of commodity chemicals and polymers for doors, windows, exterior molding, PVC pipes etc. Highly associated with residential and commercial construction and the growing renovation/remodelling industry-- particularly in Canada. This is a classic case of a very CYCLIC company. The production of PVC pipes is less linked to the business cycle and more associated with infrastructure.
  2. Share price knocked down by 50% from 52 week highs of $24 (now $11.74)
  3. Valuation ratios favourable v.s. peers: trailing P/E 5 (Q2), P/B 0.97 P/S 0.14 compared to 18, 3.3 and 1.5, respectively for peers.
  4. excellent free cash flow P/FCF of approx 5. $100 M past 12 months. Capital ex approx 3% of sales (low by industry standards)
  5. 2.9% dividend yield. Payout ratio N/A
  6. decent operating margin— 5 year average exceeding 6%. Five-year average ROE is over 23%. Recent acquisition of Royal Group improves margins and market share in Canada, where housing starts/renos have been much more stable than on the USA coastal metropolitan areas.
  7. has sold two Canadian plants for $5 M, used to pay down short and long term debt while consolidating into existing Canadian plants to maintain "scalability".
  8. Debt is favourably financed-major repayments do not start until 2012.
  9. some insider buying starting in August at $17.25/share.
  10. Charles Brandes, a well respected value investing guru, added to his position in GGC for $17.30/share to make up a total holding exceeding 2 M shares in June 2007.
  11. As of Dec 2006 Morningstar's fair value estimate is $34/share.
  12. very low EV/EBITDA ratio of 0.66 and P/B ratio of .96 make the company an attractive take over target, hopefully with a premium for the shareholder (remember that this does not always happen!).

Saturday, October 27, 2007

My view on HOG

Concerns about inventory aside, I think that HOG is currently undervalued by the market and represents an excellent long term opportunity. I would not expect much movement in the stock price for the next 8 quarters but as value investors we don't care much about that anyway, remember? Current dividend support (which may increase in subsequent quarters) may reward investors for waiting for the capital appreciation in this extremely well managed company. Many fortunes have been lost by under-estimating the American consumer's resilience.

International growth potential is significant for HOG's products and IMHO will reduce reliance on the North American consumer. A healthy generation of new products in the pipeline along with high margin merchandise/accessory sales in the HD stores are also reassuring. The downside risk of investing in HOG is 10-20% share price decrease, barring a major global recession.

I have already bought some stock at $49 for my wife's RRSP. I have a bid in for more at $47 for my holding company. I expect that further dips could take the price to the low 40's and if it does, I will quite happily buy more. I estimate that share price will appreciate 7-18% avg over the next 5 years. I've set a goal price of $80 which can be revised per the fundamentals discussed below.

Good luck with your own analysis of HOG.

Next-- the long case for GGC Georgia Gulf Corp. A much "deeper" value stock with more risk and a higher potential reward than HOG.